

23 Feb 95 Hon Alperovitz

Raskin: "Golden Lie" — Celebration of reasons for events which the decision-makers at the time ~~know~~ not to be true.

Wash Post has taken a strong position in favor of a position that has not been in favor among specialists on Hiroshima for at least 10 years.

Walker: alternatives to the bomb existed, and that Truman and his advisors knew it.

WP reporting does not hint that the majority be the consensus view as found by a review of the scholarly specialist literature.
View: No different from what DDE was saying over the years, and by his account, at the time.

RMN:

MacArthur: a tragedy that Bomb was even dropped.
Some restrictions should apply to atomic weapons
MacA was a soldier — he believed in use of force only against military targets, not against civilians.

"Revisionist" position is that of the top military leaders " [except Marshall: ambiguous] [at least, soon after war]

After Etison article, debate silenced; to echo military leaders' view beyond the pale — no one could get close, till
S ^{diaries} in 1959; Potomac Papers in 1960. The Criticism.

GA — grad student when these were opened.

Harrison Papers: a coherent effort to squish '60's criticism (GA)
Now:

Critics at the time were conservatives, not liberals
("PM" supported); JF Dulles; US News, ... critical (Baldwin
[but: Blackett; MacDonald;

Wendell Hoover, in May, to hist — tell the ~~th~~ ^{you?} can keep Emperor.
(ref?) Conservatives in Congress were saying in Cong. (in ~~fact~~ ^{you?}): Don't prolong
them: if we tell the, Emp ^{were — let the keep Emperor!}

"we believe ... there is a very good (?) chance
the war could end.

"has a very reasonable chance of ending the
war ... not an absolute certainty..."

John 9: "highly likely chance that war will end."
[ref?]

By mid-summer (?) 1945, most experts agree it
was [seen as?] highly unlikely

unconditional surrender of the Japanese military
[not, the J. people, or J. gov] — and if the way, you
can keep the Emperor.

X Not giving a guarantee — everyone agreed —
th_{ey} will fight forever

[But th_{ey} didn't! Kim Bando! and an
unbelievable assurance]

after April, you didn't want Russians to keep J's
from reinforcing Japan from China: Navy had cut
off islands. — Japanese mil. hard-liners: J's could not

US intell: SU entry...

highly likely ^(?) to end the war

Carle of: offer to Emp, SU entry, (warning of Bomb?)

Marshall

Pres

"high bluff" to end the war. (ref?)

Any kind-his offer ^{diplomatic} divorce to Russia to
keep Russians neutral (Neutrality Pact): offer the
monarchia...

April, 1945

Pres, Marshall

Ref

Peace talks

Secretary: "If we can keep the Emperor, the war's over." (C?)

Aug 12-13: Emp interviews: Emp wants to send an
envoy to Moscow, to end war as soon as possible.

Full awareness that this is a big deal - J's
collapsing.

bluff to end war.

letter to wife 1982

But goes to Potsdam to assure R. entry if Bomb doesn't work *

Fein says when that occurs.

to wife: But what I can for - SU in by Aug 15 - think of
this 16

"But know he probably didn't have to use the Bomb to
end the war...

* Wf not, then, (1) offer to Emperor; (2) warn of SU entry.

All agreed to June (? i.e. Hums, Acting Sec State)
— make offer to Camp.

July 3 — Byrnes cons in.

"Key clause", #12, taken apart of Potsdam Proc. Why?

(Dean Sigal)

Communal explanation: "Politically, it was impossible;
Am. culture was so hate-filled; no politician

(b) "Soft": He could have done it, but "wif both" —
make some points

300,000^d died because of
(not, saving US lives)

Robertson on Byrnes

(a shrewd political calculation
(not a military argument))

GA: It is impossible to find hist or record
citing a political problem with offer [?
or Byrnes

(Hull to Byrnes;

Politics

If any have been a factor; certainly, hard to
argue it was a determining factor.

Senate minority leader arguing publicly, change the terms.
(The Nation said, don't).

Used to be controversial whether low performance was a factor — there was a "controversy" w/ Wash Post. Controversy among historians is: Of course, low was a factor; question is, how important was it? Secondary? 50:50? more?

Moments ^{in year} was to seek political solution. [and was before low entry]
(not to use Barb)

Strasser did not go to b5t to brief him about Barb as an instrument to end war with Japan.

S briefs b5t April 24: Polish crisis


Barb has such an important bearing on current policy (Europe)

Meeting next day (April 25) largely deals with low.

Let our actions speak for words.

⌈

As soon as Barb works, Russians are stalled, & negot with TV losing. (not in dispute)



VCS were not asked to study use of A-bomb.

Recall: Great uncertainty as to yield of PO-bombs: 500 tons (!) ^{"experiments" 1945}
U-bombs would work, big: but not many of them. _{to 1.7}

Decisions made (not just "moments",
"assumption" Bomb would be
used...

- [GA ignores: 1) Wf not, use Bomb
2) Who said: Is it necessary? "It must be
(the?) necessary."
(McDef)
3) Desire to justify
4) No one (unless the) agrees: Avoid Bomb
unless... (if necessary)
or avoid Bomb with
all cities...

1) Q: you haven't
GA

US news 1957

Pogue 1956?

Marshall defends use of Bomb,
saves him.

Elsewhere, he says, "Not a mil. decision - a
political decision."

In May, Marshall proposes a demonstration against
a nuclear base; if doesn't work: warn them to evacuate a
city... of N. Any base had been reported, it
would have been hit long before.

GA interpretation: ~~But~~ Marshall strongly opposed
offer to Eisenhower [?]

2) What of need to justify MP?

"not bst's body." No ref by bst.

One mention by Byrnes. Knows had this (& Commit):

No evidence Knows influenced bst. [2d bomb speech

[Hyp: G affected Nagasaki: PU Bomb, had it be available
first...

(= Q. M. — ^{or giving responsibility for} blaming military, not Pres. for Bombing)

GA: "I come away with great admiration for the military."

— in the field were heroes

— mil. leaders criticized Bomb. "It was political leaders

Which cities were preserved?

N & N were shown in part because they were low on the target list.

Neither H & N fit criteria of "Target Committee": industry, surrounded by housing.

Industry in H & N was outside target areas; naval base in Nag. was outside target area.

If say: "Keep the Exp., war is likely to end."
(NO)

"Keep the Exp." — Which is another way to say, "End the war."

|| "The disaster forecast by Strasser is still to happen — if endangered the planet."

Q: "The test" would have started the air race.
(Sizeland: keep secret)

(This developed? MP? Some time to)

GA "It was a reasonable decision to build Bomb in case Hith built one... once he got missiles...

That's why scientists joined — and (some) opposed us. V)

Q: Did hst/Bomb prolong war?

GA: After July 16, hst took hard line at Potsdam;
to sustain the negotiations use of the

William Castle, Stimson's deputy

"War was prolonged, in order to use the
Bombs."

GA "you can't prove this, but it's a reasonable position.
"you could say, Jky did it to avoid a political controversy."

"5 days later, the Emperor gets his assurances." [NO]

"No problem."

at end of hst, reason for (spine on) Nag
was to keep him out of Manchuria.

at end of Show, Jky wanted to show PU Bomb:

DID HE GET PRESSURE FROM hst ON
TIMING? LIKE CHALLENGER (?)

(Classification kept the secret for 20 years)

"Jky wanted to show Jky had a weapon
that could destroy a city."

(GA: Who was Dresden bombed)

PAPE
Pape

Ernest May

Hugh Jones

Ken Diego briefing: ISIS + PU Challenge Feb. 23

1200 metric tons of HEU

150-200 " " of PU

antimatter weapons, this is at

4 places

MINATOM mil. str

Civ sites

non-mil R&D

Naval Fuel Feb. facilities

Non-Kryon want to secure W-U mat: but

Sept. 93 - agreement on DOE + Minatom

so far totally focused on CEU at one site.

likewise, discussions

on gov-gov basis,

We never have "get on hands" on W-U usable material

Lab-lab collaboration: to focus on W-U mat.

want to leverage gov-gov ops.

Create Trust; suspicion in Russia we want to de-mechanize Russia.

DOE role since March '94

Kurchatov Inst.:

and HEU, some PU

Argonne - 16: recent design facility

FY 94 budget: \$2M from DOE, \$10M from...

95

\$30M + \$15M from DOE

from Non-Kryon?

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

*Conf. to take
responsibility*

THE PRESIDENT said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.

*with op, or
with prep?
was attack
authorized?*

* * * *

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

*"?!"
(Vs. Bird,
dead?)*

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

FY 1996: DOE gets \$30M to continue gov-gov program².
lab-lab: \$40M

Next: Obninsk

70,000 disks at Obninsk (50g) ~2" diam
lying in Trays, unguarded...

[Xide: Keeping coal/cocaine in a hall on a dining
room table in an unlocked apartment:
now DOE has gotten the to put a lock on the
door.

[A prison has been turned into an
apartment house — in which valuable
contraband ~~all~~ lies about...]

85 kgs of HEU

rocks, and little balls, in pebble
bags

[The spread of the free market is going to
equalize the distribution of HEU/PU around the
world — as money is exchanged for ^(unguarded) HEU/PU.

my question: ²⁾ What does it say about the concern of
Minister/Russians that we have to 1) tell the boys
to secure something

2) give them \$1M, \$10M, \$30M for this?

1) Wait would go out to grab this stuff before the locks
arrive (plung if true): "Do you Christmas shopping early?"
2) What if Mafia watched this briefing? "We've missed the
boat"